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A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger 
December 2015 
Income Sorting 
One of the most enduring features of the American federal system is the concentration of 
higher-income people in places where the neighborhood amenities and public services are better.  
This phenomenon, which scholars call income sorting, is a key source of inequality in our 
society, because it implies that low-income people tend to live in places where, among other 
things, the public schools show relatively low performance, the crime rates are relatively high, 
and the air quality is relatively poor.  This column provides a new way to summarize the 
importance of income sorting in our society. 
 
The starting point for understanding income sorting is the recognition that metropolitan 
areas in the United States are divided into many different local governments. Consider the case 
of school districts.  A few metropolitan areas, such as Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, Nevada, 
have a single school district, but most metropolitan areas have many school districts, and some 
have an astonishing number.  The New York City area has 775!  Table 1 shows the number of 













Jacksonville, Florida 7 206,400    3.39      
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, North and South Carolina 10 295,265    3.39      
Indianapolis-Carmel, Indiana 50 298,492    16.75    
Akron, Ohio 45 101,000    44.55    
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 68 239,900    28.35    
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 104 316,933    32.81    
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Arizona 321 734,000    43.73    
Table 1. School Districts and Students in Selected Metropolitan Areas, 2010
 
With so many school districts, other local governments, and neighborhoods to choose 
from, households must compete with each other in the housing market for entry into the places 
1 These examples come from Jennifer J. Holme and Kara S. Finnigan, “School Diversity, School District 
Fragmentation and Metropolitan Policy,” Teachers College Record 115 November 2013), pp. 1-29, and Meredith P. 
Richards and Kori J. Stroub, “The Fragmentation of Metropolitan Public School Districts and the Segregation of 
American Schools: A Longitudinal Analysis.” Teachers College Record 116 (December 2014), pp. 1-30. 
 
                                                 
with the highest-quality public services, the lowest taxes, and the nicest amenities.  Higher 
income is obviously an advantage in this competition. Moreover, this process is self-reinforcing, 
because higher incomes lead to lower costs for public services (a topic in many of my previous 
columns) and high-income communities often insure themselves against future changes in their 
make-up by implementing zoning regulations. 
 
My recent study of the Cleveland area in 2000 provides a new way to measure the 
income sorting associated with school-district quality, which is measured by the share of students 
who enter the 12th grade and subsequently pass all five mandated state tests.2 This study finds 
that a one standard deviation increase in homeowner income leads, purely because of income 
sorting, to a 1.30 standard deviation increase in this school passing rate. The average homeowner 
income is $38,136, and a one standard deviation increase corresponds to a 41.3 percent increase 
over this average.  Moreover, the average passing rate is 32.0 percent and a 1.30 standard 
deviation increase corresponds to a 82.8 percent increase in this average.  This is a large effect; 
starting from average values, a 41.3 percent increase in income leads to a 82.8 percent increase 
in the passing rate for the school district where a household wins the competition for housing.3 
 
It is also possible to look at sorting in a more general way. With a large sample of house 
sales and extensive information on structural housing traits, one can estimate the overall value in 
the housing market of a house’s neighborhood attributes, such as school quality and access to 
parks, associated with each location, where a location is defined as a census block group (CBG) 
or some other small geographic unit.4 This value can be called “neighborhood quality” or 
“neighborhood housing value.” The extent of income sorting can be measured by examining the 
relationship between neighborhood quality and income. The result for the Cleveland area is 
plotted in Figure 1. The horizontal axis is the median income of a homeowner in a CBG.  This 
variable is expressed in log form.  A log of 10.0 corresponds to an income of $22,026; a log of 
12.0 indicates and income of $162,755.  The vertical axis is neighborhood quality. This variable 
is also expressed in log form; the units are arbitrary, but a percentage change is not.  Each dot in 
the figure represents a CBG.5 
 
2 John Yinger, “Hedonic Markets and Sorting Equilibria: Bid-Function Envelopes for Public Services and 
Neighborhood Amenities,” Journal of Urban Economics 86 (March 2015), pp. 9-25. There are 74 school districts in 
my Cleveland area data set. 
 
3 These figures refer to the gross impact of income. As shown in my paper, if one controls for other demand factors, 
such as the number of children in a household, the impact is 52.2 percent instead of 82.8 percent. 
 
4 This approach has been used by many scholars other than me, including Yongheng Deng, Stephen L. Ross, and 
Susan M. Wachter. “Racial Differences in Homeownership:  The Effect of Residential Location,” Regional Science 
and Urban Economics 33 (5)(2003), pp. 517-56; and Dennis Epple, Michael Peress, and Holger Sieg, “Identification 
and Semiparametric Estimation of Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions,” American Economic Journal: 
Microeconomics 2 (4)(2010), pp. 195–220.  
 
5 Along the fitted line, neighborhood quality increases 304 percent from the lowest to the highest value.  My article 
cited above finds that neighborhood quality increases 30 percent from the lowest to the highest value of the school- 
quality measure discussed earlier; that is, school quality changes make up about 10 percent of the overall 
neighborhood quality change.  
                                                 
This figure indicates a strong relationship between overall neighborhood quality and 
income.  On average, a one percent increase in homeowner income leads to a 0.524 percent 
increase in neighborhood quality.  This relationship is illustrated by the “fitted values” in the 
figure.  Another way to express this result is to say that starting from the average values, a 10 
percent increase in income ($3,814) leads to a 5.24 percent increase in the amount households 
are willing to pay for neighborhood quality, holding housing characteristics constant.  
 
 This income sorting is a central cause of inequality in local public service outcomes.  
Compared to higher communities, low-income communities must pay more to obtain the same 
quality of local public services, must levy higher local tax rates to raise the same revenue, and 
end up with lower-quality public services.  In the case of education, income sorting is the main 
reason for large disparities in school quality, as measured by test scores and graduation rates, 
between high-income and low-income school districts. States have made efforts to offset these 
disparities, which are clearly unfair to children in low-income districts, by implementing 
educational aid formulas in which aid increases with share of students from poor families and 
decreases with district wealth.  These programs are admirable, but they do not come close to 
eliminating these disparities. Under some circumstances other public policies, including inter-
district choice, housing vouchers, and inclusionary zoning, make small contributions to lowering 
these disparities. Income sorting is a powerful phenomenon, however, and no set of feasible 
policies to eliminate its impact on inequality in education and other public services has yet been 
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